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Abstract
Evaluating others is a fundamental feature of human social interaction–we like those who help more than those who hinder.
In the present research, we examined social evaluation of those who not only intentionally performed good and bad actions
but also those to whom good things have happened (the lucky) and those to whom bad things have happened (the
unlucky). In Experiment 1a, subjects demonstrated a sympathetic preference for the unlucky. However, under cognitive load
(Experiment 1b), no such preference was expressed. Further, in Experiments 2a and 2b, when a time delay between
impression formation (learning) and evaluation (memory test) was introduced, results showed that younger (Experiment 2a)
and older adults (Experiment 2b) showed a significant preference for the lucky. Together these experiments show that a
consciously motivated sympathetic preference for those who are unlucky dissolves when memory is disrupted. The
observed dissociation provides evidence for the presence of conscious good intentions (favoring the unlucky) and the
cognitive compromising of such intentions when memory fails.
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Introduction
Humans have a basic need to understand and interact with
those around us. As a result, we are not mindless observers; rather
we actively form impressions of others, deciding whom we do and
do not like. Not surprisingly, one factor we weigh is a person’s
previous intentional actions. That is, we are more likely to favor
someone who volunteers for the PTA or donates books to the
library over someone who cheats on his taxes or cuts in line at the
grocery store. Even 3 month old infants show this basic
preference–preferring helpful agents to harmful agents [1]. In
contrast to intentional acts such as these, events that are outside
human control–events we might call lucky or unlucky–seem less
appropriate as bases for our evaluations. Whether Jane’s house is
destroyed by a tornado or Joe wins the lottery tells us nothing
about the inherent worth of either person; the randomness of these
events signals that they could have happened to anybody and
therefore, rationally, we should not use them as the basis for
judgment.
In the current research, we test the hypothesis that two
processes contribute to people’s evaluations of lucky and unlucky
individuals: a more automatic tendency to favor the lucky over the
unlucky, and a top-down effort to overcome this tendency.
According to this hypothesis, we are less successful in overcoming
the automaticity of the first tendency (and therefore more likely to
prefer lucky people over unlucky people) when under cognitive
load or when declarative memory for the event details is
compromised. To examine this hypothesis, we asked people to
evaluate lucky targets, unlucky targets, intentional good actors and
intentional bad actors. They made these evaluations immediately
with no load (Experiment 1a), under cognitive load (Experiment
1b), and after a delay (Experiments 2a and 2b). By investigating
the effects of cognitive load and delay on people’s evaluations, we
hoped to limit conscious, deliberative processing such as effortful
empathy or self-presentation concerns; we predicted that this
would reveal a relative preference for lucky individuals.
The Luck Preference
The tendency to favor the lucky over the unlucky is predicted by
just world beliefs [2], associative mechanisms [3], or both. Just
World Theory argues that in order to avoid the psychological
threat of a chaotic and unpredictable world, people develop the
beliefs that ‘‘good things happen to good people’’ and ‘‘bad things
happen to bad people.’’ These beliefs lead to favoring the lucky
and disparaging the unlucky [2]. People may also come to favor
the lucky because of associative links between lucky or unlucky
events and the people experiencing them. That is, they may
engage in what might be called ‘‘affective tagging’’ or the
spreading of affect from an event to the target of that event [3].
Importantly, Lerner [4] has argued that the tendency to show
just world thinking emerges most clearly when people are under
high load, cannot escape a situation, or are otherwise pressured. In
contrast, in situations of unlimited time and cognitive resources,
people’s explicit moral reasoning, empathy, or reliance on
egalitarian beliefs are more likely to guide judgments and
behavior, he argues. Therefore, despite our prediction that people
may generally favor the lucky over the unlucky, we predict that
adults also know, at least explicitly, that it is critical to evaluate
people based primarily on their intentional actions, and not on the
lucky or unlucky things that happen to them. We predict that
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when engagement of conscious cognition and regulatory processes
are possible, people will likely recognize that the effects of luck are
dissociable from the effects of effort and intention, and therefore
largely irrelevant in evaluating the value of a person. This is likely
to lead to either equivalent evaluations of lucky and unlucky
targets, or even higher evaluations of the unlucky. Following this
reasoning, when people are tested under cognitive constraints,
such as under conditions of cognitive load or diminished explicit
memory, we predict that conscious processing such as egalitarian
beliefs and/or impression management concerns would have less
of an opportunity to unfold. This prediction is consistent with
observations in young children, who presumably engage in less
impression management [5], and who show a preference for those
who are lucky over those who are unlucky [3,6]. Specifically, in
adults, we predict that a luck preference would be observed in the
performance of an evaluation task while under cognitive
constraints.
We tested our two-part hypothesis–that adults’ explicit attitudes
toward the lucky and unlucky may be influenced by conscious,
deliberative processes, and that if these processes can be removed,
adults will prefer the lucky to the unlucky– using two approaches:
cognitive load and reduced explicit memory (see [7] for a similar
approach in the domain of cognitive dissonance).
Cognitive load. A signature feature of human cognition is
that it is limited: humans can attend to and process a limited
amount of information at a given time. Researchers can exploit
this feature to understand many aspects of cognition and social
cognition. A common cognitive load task involves requiring the
completion of two tasks–one more deliberative and one more
automatic–at once. This strategy is known to reduce the ability to
engage in deliberative tasks, while allowing more automatic
processes to remain relatively unaffected (e.g., [8–11]). For
example, Gilbert and colleagues [12] hypothesized that people
automatically draw inferences about others (e.g., the woman looks
sad… she is a depressive person), and only subsequently correct
those inferences based on the context (she is sad only because her
dog just died, so she may not be a sad person in general). Under
cognitive load participants drew the initial inference, but did not
correct it in response to contextual cues as they did in the absence
of load.
In the case of evaluations of the lucky and unlucky, we tested
whether people would show a luck preference in the control
condition of no load (Experiment 1a). Then, we tested whether the
addition of cognitive load, or the reduced ability to engage in
conscious processing, would reduce the tendency to favor the
unlucky (Experiment 1b).
Memory. Manipulating memory, and specifically, reducing
people’s ability to explicitly remember information, may similarly
reduce the impact of conscious processing on an underlying
automatic evaluation, such as a tendency to favor the lucky. There
is considerable evidence supporting a dissociation between
evaluations of individuals and the explicit retention of information
about those individuals. In one review, Hastie and Park [13] noted
that while there are experimental conditions under which memory
and evaluations can be linked, it is far more common to observe
people using ‘‘on-line processing’’ during which they are forming
impressions without consciously remembering the attributes
leading to that impression. Importantly, on-line processing has
been demonstrated to be associated with higher certainty in one’s
social evaluations, as well as a stronger attitude-behavior
correspondence, such as selection of a favorite political candidate
[14–15].
The current work builds on a series of classic studies
demonstrating evidence of this dissociation between memory
and evaluations. For example, Johnson, Kim, and Risse [16] tested
patients with Korsakoff’s amnesia, presenting them with two faces,
each paired with a story about an individual–one who had
performed a series of good, noble acts (e.g., saving someone’s life)
and one who had performed a series of bad, immoral acts (e.g.,
abusing his wife). At three time points ranging from two hours to
twenty days later, the patients were presented with the two faces
and asked whom they liked better and who was nicer.
Remarkably, despite recalling almost nothing about the individ-
uals, the majority of patients (78%-89% across sessions) liked the
‘‘good’’ guy better than the ‘‘bad’’ guy. These patients had formed
affective evaluations of the targets and had retained this affective
information associated with the faces, despite explicitly forgetting
the information that led to these affective evaluations.
A similar study by Tranel and Damasio [17] found that an
amnesic patient with extensive neural damage, including bilateral
hippocampi and amygdalae, preferred to interact with an
experimenter who had been consistently nice on several previous
days of testing, over a neutral experimenter; the same patient also
showed a preference for the neutral experimenter over one who
had been curt and unfriendly over several previous days of testing.
All of these preferences occurred despite the patient’s failure to
explicitly recall having met the experimenters before. Finally, in a
more recent demonstration, Todorov and I. Olson [18] showed
that an amnesic patient with bilateral hippocampal damage
retained affective associations with a series of faces that had been
paired with single sentences describing aggressive, disgusting, or
kind (vs. neutral) actions.
Conceptually similar results have been found with neurologi-
cally intact populations. Somerville, Wig, Whalen and Kelley [19]
conducted a study in which neurologically-healthy adults were
exposed to faces of individuals along with positive phrases (Emily
helps the homeless), negative phrases (Bob is a deadbeat dad),
neutral phrases (Eric likes carrots) or no phrases. Two weeks after
seeing the phrases and faces, participants were scanned while
performing a simple old/new memory task for the faces.
Somerville et al. [19] found that emotional contexts (both positive
and negative) were associated with more right amygdala activation
than neutral contexts, and that this effect existed irrespective of
whether participants could explicitly recall the context or not. This
finding suggests that the targets were associated with a valence that
remained even after the context was forgotten.
The studies reviewed so far have focused exclusively on later
evaluations of targets who have performed intentional good and
bad actions. To our knowledge only one existing study has asked
about social evaluations of valenced targets who did not perform
intentional actions after a delay. Li, Spitzer, and Olson [20],
presented 4 and 5 year old children with targets who, for an
unknown reason, received differential amounts of a resource
(playdough). The authors found that in an immediate evaluation
task, children indicated that they preferred the person who had
more resources. The critical comparison was with a condition in
which another group of children simply saw the targets in passing
but were not asked to make any evaluations until after a delay.
Several minutes after viewing the targets, during which they forgot
who had more playdough, these children showed a preference for
the target who had more resources previously.
All of these studies suggest that people can and do associate
affective information with people, based on even minimal
information about the targets’ actions or current conditions [21];
that they form these associations even without being instructed to
do so; and that they rely on the retained affective information even
after forgetting the information that led to the initial affective
evaluation. Our hypothesis is that the valence of lucky and unlucky
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events may be similar to the valence associated with intentional
actions in affecting evaluations of the people tied to those events.
We predict that this valence informs evaluations of those targets,
even without explicit memory for an individual’s lucky or unlucky
status.
The Current Work
In sum, our primary prediction is that people have an
underlying tendency to favor the lucky, but that this tendency is
reduced and even reversed by controlled processes (e.g., impres-
sion management, demand effects, effortful or controlled empathy,
egalitarian concerns, etc). We predict that under conditions that
allow these conscious processes (unlimited time, unlimited
resources), adults will show no preference, or that they may even
overcorrect, leading them to favor the unlucky (Experiment 1a).
We predict that this tendency to favor the unlucky will be reduced
or eliminated when participants are asked to simultaneously
complete a second task that requires the use of additional cognitive
resources because the conscious processes will be less active
(Experiment 1b). Finally, we predict that if we create conditions
under which adults can no longer explicitly recall who was lucky
and who was unlucky, they will actually favor the lucky
(Experiments 2a and 2b). We tested this last prediction in both
younger adults (Experiment 2a) and older adults (Experiment 2b)
because older adults have been shown to rely more heavily on
affect when making decisions (see [22] for a recent review) and to
have less effective retention of episodic information (see [23] for a
recent review), factors likely to increase the luck preference even
more.
Experiment 1a and 1b
Evaluations of the Lucky and Unlucky under Limited and
Unlimited Cognitive Resources
Experiments 1a and 1b were designed to assess whether adults
demonstrate the luck preference in a situation of unlimited vs.
limited time and cognitive resources. In previous work, 5–7-year-
old children evaluated the lucky more favorably than the unlucky
under conditions of unlimited cognitive resources [6]. Consider-
able research suggests that concerns with social desirability and
attempts to control bias emerge after this age [24–25] leading to
the prediction that adults might actually report the opposite
preference–favoring those who are unlucky. When adults’
cognitive resources are limited, social desirability, cognitive
control, and even empathy are predicted to be less active, thereby
reducing the likelihood that adults will favor the unlucky. To test
these hypotheses, adult participants were shown photographs of
people paired with statements and asked to form an impression of
each person (‘‘target’’). The statements described an intentional
good action or intentional bad action performed by the target, or a
lucky (random good) event or unlucky (random bad) event
experienced by the target. Participants evaluated each target after
the paired statement was removed either under conditions of
unlimited cognitive resources (Experiment 1a) or under conditions
of limited cognitive resources (Experiment 1b).
Importantly, in the case of limited cognitive resources we
wanted to interfere with effortful reasoning processes without
interfering with participants’ abilities to read the stimuli or
understand them. Therefore we had participants complete the
same task as in Experiment 1a while also completing a
simultaneous short-term visual memory task (using figures similar
to those in [26]). Whereas we expected that cognitive load would
alter participants’ evaluations of the unlucky compared to the
lucky, we made no such prediction for evaluations of the
intentional good and bad targets. As we discussed at the outset,
it is likely that people will always favor intentional good to bad
targets, unhindered by concerns of impression management or
other deliberative processes; after all, even 6 month old babies
prefer intentional good to bad targets [27]. Therefore, we
predicted that adults would not prefer the unlucky to the lucky
under load, but they would prefer intentional good targets over
intentional bad targets.
Methods
Participants. Participants included 23 adult college students
(Mage = 21 years, SD=3 years, 16 females, 7 males) in Experiment
1a (unlimited cognitive resources) and 23 adult college students
(Mage=20 years, SD=2 years; 14 female, 9 male) in Experiment 1b
(limited cognitive resources). All students were recruited at the
same university in the Northeastern United States and participated
in exchange for a small payment or credit toward a research
requirement.
Ethics statement. These studies, including the consent forms
used, were approved by the human subjects committees at
Harvard University, Yale University, and Boston College. All
participants signed a consent form before participating. The
authors are happy to share the data files described in this paper
with any interested researchers.
Stimuli. Stimuli included four types of statements: intentional
good acts (e.g., ‘‘Leonard pulled over to help a motorist with his
stalled car.’’); intentional bad acts (e.g., ‘‘Matt left the restaurant
before paying the bill.’’); lucky events (e.g., ‘‘Andrew was walking
when he found $5 on the ground.’’); and unlucky events (e.g.,
‘‘Richard was stuck in the elevator for three hours with ten other
people.’’), as well as photographs of White male faces, all on
standardized backgrounds. Two sets of 40 photographs were used
such that half of participants saw one set and the other half saw a
completely different set. Within each set of photographs,
participants saw one of two randomized assignments of photo-
graphs with statements. A single race and gender was selected in
order to minimize the number of dimensions that varied
throughout the experiment and concerns that participants might
believe the experiment was about race or gender and therefore
spend differential attention on some photographs over others.
These statements were pilot tested (all Ns$10 independent
raters) separately for valence, level of control, and level of
intention. Good, bad, lucky, and unlucky statements were
provided such that lucky experiences and intentional good actions
were judged as equally positive on average (participants were
asked ‘‘How good or bad is the outcome or action?’’), and unlucky
experiences and intentional bad actions were judged to be equally
negative, on average. The items varied in terms of extremity from
more trivial or mundane events and actions to more extreme,
consequential events and actions, with an equal number of both
types in all categories. Finally, the intentional actions had been
rated by pilot participants as highly and equivalently controlled
and intended by the targets, and the lucky/unlucky events were
judged to be equivalently low on intention and control. All items
are listed in Appendix S1.
Procedure. College students were recruited to participate in
a short study on ‘‘impression formation and multi-tasking.’’ They
were brought into a small testing room one at a time and seated in
front of a computer. In Experiment 1a (No Load Condition) they
were told that they would see faces of individuals paired with
statements, that they should form an impression of each one, and
that after forming the impression they would be asked to evaluate
the target (‘‘How do you feel about the man you just read about?’’)
on a scale from 1 (dislike completely) to 6 (like completely).
Forgetting Undermines Good Intentions
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Participants then began the task. They had 10 seconds to form an
impression and unlimited time to provide an evaluation. Total
participation took approximately 10–15 minutes for 40 face-
sentence pairs.
In Experiment 1b (Cognitive Load Condition) participants were
told that they would complete two tasks at one time: a social
evaluation task (identical to the one in Experiment 1a) and a
memory experiment. Before each impression formation/evalua-
tion trial participants were shown a Phillips figure [26] for 2
seconds. They were told that after each impression formation/
evaluation trial they would see another such design and their task
was to decide if it was the same as the one before that trial or not (it
was new on 50% of trials). Participants had unlimited time to
evaluate the target and to answer the memory question. This
particular cognitive load task was selected because it requires
significant cognitive resources (visual-spatial resources) but did not
interfere with participants’ ability to read the impression
formation/evaluation items. The study took 15–20 minutes to
complete.
Results
Omnibus ANOVA. We first computed a 2 (valence: positive
vs. negative) X 2 (intentionality/controllability: intentional/con-
trollable vs. unintentional/uncontrollable) repeated-measures AN-
OVA for Studies 1a and 1b. In Study 1a we found a significant
effect of valence, F(1, 22) = 132.93, p,.001, such that positively-
valenced items were rated more positively than negatively-
valenced items. There was also a significant effect of intentional-
ity/controllability, F(1,22) = 38.45, p,.001, such that the uninten-
tional/uncontrollable items were rated more positively than the
intentional/controllable ones. Finally, these main effects were
qualified by a significant interaction, F(1,22) = 109.57, p,.001,
such that the difference between positively and negatively-
valenced items was bigger for the intentional/controllable items
than the unintentional/uncontrollable items. In Study 1b we
conducted the same omnibus test and found similar results. Again
there was a significant effect of valence, F(1, 22) = 269.37, p,.001,
an effect of intentionality/controllability, F(1,22) = 49.74, p,.001,
and these effects were qualified by a significant interaction,
F(1,22) = 190.81, p,.001.
The luck preference. Our primary question, however,
concerned whether adults, like children, would prefer the lucky
to the unlucky under conditions of unlimited time and resources
(Experiment 1a) and whether this same effect would be evident
under cognitive load (Experiment 1b). We found that adults did not
prefer the lucky (M=3.79) under conditions of unlimited time and
resources, and in fact that they preferred the unlucky (M=4.00), as
indicated by a paired t-test, t(22) = 2.53, p= .02, see Table 1. For
comparison, we also assessed whether they preferred intentionally
good actors (M=4.78) to intentionally bad actors (M=2.15),
which, not surprisingly, they did, t(22) = 11.50, p,.001.
Under cognitive load (Experiment 1b), however, participants
showed no preference for the unlucky (M=3.98) over the lucky
(M=3.93), t(22),1.0, p..30, see Table 1, but did favor the
intentional good actors (M=4.74) over the intentional bad actors
(M=2.03), t(22) = 15.57, p,.001, as they had in Experiment 1a.
Discussion
A central question of this first study concerned whether adults
would prefer the lucky to the unlucky under conditions of
unlimited time and cognitive resources. As predicted, we found
that they did not. Instead, adults indicated that they preferred the
unlucky to the lucky, but only when they had unlimited cognitive
resources during evaluation. When participants were under
cognitive load, they showed no preference for the unlucky, despite
continuing to show a preference for good over bad targets.
While we hypothesized that people have an underlying
tendency to favor the lucky, we believe that adults override this
tendency when they have the opportunity to do so, as they did in
Experiment 1a. The lack of a tendency to favor the unlucky in
Experiment 1b is consistent with our hypothesis that conscious,
cognitively-demanding processes were at least partially responsible
for the tendency to favor the unlucky over the lucky in Experiment
1a.
Importantly, the results on the intentional good and bad items
in Experiment 1b demonstrate that participants were able to read
and process the statements while under cognitive load, suggesting
that the lack of a preference for lucky over unlucky (or unlucky
over lucky) was not simply driven by participants’ failure to read
and comprehend statements while performing the visual-spatial
task. As further evidence that the load was not too challenging, on
average, participants correctly identified whether the second
stimulus was identical to the first 91% of the time (50% would
be chance).
That said, because participants did not show a luck preference,
but instead a lack of preference for the unlucky under load, their
performance in this experiment is compatible with two different
explanations. First, people may not be subject to the luck
preference. Instead, their feelings of empathy or jealousy may
lead them to favor the unlucky under conditions of low cognitive
load, and these feelings may diminish or diminish in their impact
as load increases. Second, adults may experience a luck preference
as children do [6], but they both suppress it and override it under
optimal cognitive conditions. In the present experiment, the
cognitive load may have diminished the strength of this over-
correction process, but it may not have been strong enough to
eliminate that process altogether (the latter is supported by
participants’ high performance on the memory task). Perhaps
participants were able to engage in some controlled processes but
not enough to completely override an underlying luck preference.
Experiments 2a and 2b distinguish these possibilities by taking a
different approach to reduce the influence of conscious, deliber-
ative processing on adults’ evaluations of others, namely reducing
explicit memory for the statements (c.f. [13,16]). If adults prefer
the unlucky because of automatically-induced empathy or
jealousy, then they should continue to prefer the unlucky in
Experiments 2a and 2b. In contrast, if explicit preference for the
unlucky results from an explicit correction of an unconscious
preference for the lucky, then when explicit memory is reduced or
eliminated, a preference for the lucky should emerge. Conscious
Table 1. Mean evaluations (and standard deviations) of Good
and Bad actors and Lucky and Unlucky targets in each study.
Higher numbers indicate greater liking.
Good Bad Lucky Unlucky
Exp 1A: Immediate
Evaluation
4.78 (.55) 2.15 (.82) 3.79 (.53) 4.00 (.50)
Exp 1B: Cognitive
Load
4.74 (.40) 2.03 (.51) 3.93 (.40) 3.98 (.43)
Exp 2A: Memory - Younger
Adults
3.52 (.59) 3.34 (.57) 3.57 (.59) 3.42 (.58)
Exp 2B: Memory - Older
Adults
4.05 (.85) 2.47 (.65) 3.95 (.62) 2.74 (.79)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079091.t001
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correction should not reverse this preference, because participants
will fail to remember when it is necessary and when it is not.
Experiments 2a and 2b: Effects of Delay on
Evaluations of the Lucky and Unlucky
In Experiments 2a and 2b we tested evaluations of the lucky and
unlucky after a delay to ask whether the luck preference exists in
adults, but is masked in situations of uninhibited processing
(Experiment 1a). Participants learned about good, bad, lucky and
unlucky people without explicitly evaluating them. Then, after a
delay during which we expected participants to forget which
individuals were good, bad, lucky or unlucky, we tested whether
participants would express a preference for lucky over unlucky
(and good over bad) targets. Conceptually similar work has
demonstrated that a valenced ‘‘tag’’ can be created upon hearing
of intentional good and bad actors, and later retrieved in the
absence of declarative memory for the events informing the
evaluation [16–17].
There were a few reasons to investigate this question within a
population of older adults (Experiment 2b) in addition to a
younger adult sample (Experiment 2a) like the ones used in the
previous two experiments. First, it seemed plausible that while a
delay might impair younger adults’ memory, their memory might
remain so strong that they would not reach chance performance.
Older adults have worse episodic memory than young adults, and
their memory for associative information is particularly poor (e.g.,
[28]). Thus, older adults were more likely to forget the particular
actions or events associated with each person. Moreover, even
when older adults retain those details, they can be less likely than
young adults to focus on those details, and instead are more likely
to rely on schematic, general information (e.g., [29–30]). Older
adults are particularly likely to attend to the affective tone of
information and to rely on affect as information when making
decisions (e.g., [31–32]). Testing both younger adults and older
adults allowed us to examine the hypothesis that adults show a luck
preference, and to explore how an associative mechanism might
explain such a preference.
Methods
Participants. Fifty-four college student participants (M=22
years old, SD=5 years; 32 female, 22 male) completed Experiment
2a at a campus in the Northeastern United States in exchange for
a small payment or for credit as part of a research requirement. An
additional five participants were excluded: 2 did not complete all
parts of the experiment, 2 were excessively fast in completing the
tasks (leading us to believe they did not pay attention to the tasks),
and one experienced a computer malfunction during the study.
Experiment 2b included 24 older adults aged 53–84 (16 female;
M=70 years, SD=8 years; M=15 years of education, SD= 2.7
years). The latter participants had previously completed a number
of diagnostic health, mental health and cognitive tasks and none
indicated signs of clinical depression (Beck Depression, M=0.9,
range 0–6), dementia (Mini-mental status examination, M=29.3,
range 27–30), or anxiety (Beck Anxiety, M=3.9, range 0–9).
(For various reasons the sample size was much larger in
Experiment 2a than in the other experiments in this paper. If,
however, we examine only the first 24 participants (the same
sample size as the Experiment 2b), the primary result–namely a
significant preference for the lucky–still emerges t(23) = 2.95,
p= .007).
Procedure. Experiment 2a began with an encoding phase in
which participants saw 40 photographs, each paired with a unique
statement (from Experiment 1a) for 10 seconds, and were asked to
form an impression of each person. This phase was nearly identical
to that in Experiment 1a; the only difference was that participants
were not asked to make an evaluation after forming each
impression. (Note, one lucky event in Experiment 2a was
significantly less preferred than all other lucky events, all
ps,.002, and was therefore excluded from all analyses. This item
was replaced in Experiments 1a, 1b and 2b (which were all run
after Experiment 2a) with a different, equally rated, lucky item. No
other item was significantly more liked or disliked than all other
items in the same category.).
After encoding, participants completed 20 minutes of filler tasks
(e.g., sudoku puzzles). Next, participants completed a face recognition
task in which they indicated whether each of 80 faces (40 old,
40 new) had been seen in the encoding phase or not. The 40
photographs that were old for half of participants were new for the
other half of participants and vice versa for the other 40
photographs. Then participants completed an evaluative rating task
in which they saw the 40 faces viewed during the encoding phase
along with 10 novel faces (included so that we could tell them that
if the face looked unfamiliar they could just guess at an evaluation)
and rated their preference for each face on a 6-point scale (with
higher numbers signifying greater liking). Finally, participants
completed a memory test in which they viewed the faces from the
encoding phase and chose which of the four categories of
statements had been originally paired with the face (good
action/bad action/lucky event/unlucky event; note that this was
the first time these four categories were explicitly introduced). The
order of presentation of faces varied for each task, and two
versions of each task were used to protect against potential effects
of order.
The procedure in Experiment 2b (older adults) was identical to
the procedure from Experiment 2a (younger adults) with two
exceptions. For the older adults, five neutral practice face+state-
ment pairs were included prior to encoding to be certain that each
participant had sufficient time to read the statement before the
slides forwarded automatically. In the rare case that a participant
was unable to read these items quickly enough (N= 4), the
participant was administered a self-paced version of the encoding
task. Also, no new faces were presented in the evaluative rating
task in order to shorten the task for older participants.
Results: Experiment 2a
Explicit memory. Participants recognized the faces of
individuals from the encoding task as familiar more often than
expected by chance; that is, they correctly recalled which faces
were new more often than they mistakenly labeled new faces as
old, M=0.49, t(53) = 15.61, p,.001 for lucky/unlucky items and
M= .53, t(53) = 17.56, p,.001 for good/bad items, one-sample t-
test compared to 0. Participants had fairly poor memory for the
type of event (e.g., lucky) associated with a particular target,
though rates of recognition were significantly above chance: for
intentional good/bad items (M=36% correct, chance = 25%),
t(53) = 7.25, p,.001, and for lucky/unlucky items (M=29%
correct, chance = 25%), t(53) = 2.72, p= .009.
Omnibus ANOVA. We next computed a 2 (valence: positive
vs. negative) X 2 (intentionality/controllability: intentional/con-
trollable vs. unintentional/uncontrollable) repeated-measures AN-
OVA as we had in Studies 1a and 1b. In Study 2a we found a
significant effect of valence such that positively-valenced items
were rated more positively than negatively valenced items, F(1,
53) = 10.26, p= .002. In contrast to the previous studies we found
no significant difference in the treatment of intentional/control-
lable vs. unintentional/uncontrollable items, p= .130, and no
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significant interaction between valence and intentionality/control-
lability, p= .663.
The luck preference. Analyses parallel to those from
Experiments 1a and 1b were conducted on the liking ratings to
assess whether participants showed a preference for the (un)lucky.
In contrast to Experiments 1a and 1b, participants, after a delay,
preferred the lucky (M=3.57) to the unlucky (M=3.42),
t(53) = 2.26, p= .028, see Table 1. They also preferred intentional
good actors (M=3.52) to intentional bad actors (M=3.34),
t(53) = 2.39, p= .02.
Relationship between liking and memory. Importantly,
there was no relationship between the extent of the luck preference
(Mlucky – Munlucky) and performance on the type of memory task,
r= .20, p= .15, demonstrating that there was no relationship
between an individual’s memory performance for who experi-
enced which type of event and their overall tendency to favor the
lucky over the unlucky. Interestingly, those with particularly bad
explicit memory did not show more of a luck preference, perhaps
because no participants showed particularly strong memory and
therefore no one could reliably use memory in forming
evaluations. Instead, participants likely formed affective associa-
tions with the faces, and used the stored affective information in
their explicit evaluations of the faces 20 minutes later.
Results: Experiment 2b
Explicit memory. The older adult participants were also
able to recognize individuals as familiar or not, as indicated by
their relatively high performance on the face recognition task (hits
minus false alarms, M=0.35), t(23) = 6.62, p,.001, one sample t-
test. However, these participants had considerable trouble
recalling the type of event associated with each target, as indicated
by performance not significantly different than chance on the
memory task (M=28.0%, chance = 25%), t(23) = 1.70, p= .10,
one-sample t-test. Participants were not significantly better at
recalling the type of event associated with the intentional good/
bad items (M=29% correct) than the lucky/unlucky items
(M=27% correct), p..25, though performance was marginally
better than chance for intentional good/bad items, one sample t-
test, t(23) = 1.96, p= .06, and was not significantly different from
chance for lucky/unlucky items, p..40.
Omnibus ANOVA. In Study 1b, participants showed a main
effect for valence such that they preferred positively-valenced items
to negatively-valenced ones, F(1, 23) = 32.34, p,.001. Participants
showed no significant effect of intentionality/controllability,
F(1,23) = .91, p= .349. Finally, there was a significant interaction
between valence and intentionality/controllability, F(1,23) = 4.45,
p= .046, suggesting that the difference between positively- and
negatively-valenced items was smaller in the case of unintentional/
uncontrollable items than intentional/controllable ones.
The luck preference. Like their younger counterparts, older
adults also preferred the lucky (M=3.95) to the unlucky (2.74),
t(23) = 5.18, p,.001, see Table 1, and preferred intentional good
actors (4.05) to intentional bad actors (2.47), t(23) = 5.53, p,.001.
In fact, older adults’ preferences for the lucky over the unlucky and
their preference for intentional good over bad actors were larger
than younger adults’ preferences, equal variances not assumed,
t(26.40) = 4.42, p,.001, and, t(26.40) = 4.72, p,.001, respectively.
Older adults showed a slightly larger good preference than luck
preference, t(23) = 2.11, p= .046.
Relationship between liking and memory. As was the
case with younger adults, memory for the type of event associated
with each face was not significantly related to the luck preference
index, r= .15, p..45, providing additional evidence of the
dissociation between remembering specifics about the targets
and evaluations of the targets.
Discussion
Both younger and older adult participants, after a delay,
preferred lucky to unlucky individuals, despite the fact that they
had poor memory for who was actually lucky and unlucky. This
finding is the opposite of the finding in Experiment 1a, in which
younger adults explicitly preferred the unlucky to the lucky when
they evaluated individuals with no delay (or load). This shift in
evaluations provides initial evidence that adults prefer the lucky to
the unlucky–but under conditions of unlimited time and cognitive
resources, they report a preference for the unlucky because of
other consciously-controlled processes.
That said, the actual effect sizes in the memory studies,
especially in the younger adult sample, were fairly small. This
occurred, we suspect, because adults were given the somewhat
awkward task of coming up with an explicit evaluation of people
about whom they could recall almost nothing. It is more surprising
that any differences did emerge, and it would be unreasonable to
expect these evaluations to be as large in absolute magnitude as
some of the effects in the immediate evaluation condition.
Interestingly, while both older and younger adults relied heavily
on valence in their evaluations, this difference was noticeably
greater in older adults. This greater reliance on valence is likely to
be explained by some combination of older adults’ greater reliance
on schematic, general information rather than details [29–30] and
their increased reliance on affective information when making
decisions [31–32]. In other words, by creating a general gist and
using affect more as the basis of on-line judgments, the older adults
presumably had a stronger affective tag to rely on when they were
asked to make evaluations 20 minutes after the initial impressions
were formed. Preference for the lucky (and for the good) may be
particularly likely to be revealed in situations where people are
relying on the affective tag associated with an item, and when they
have little memory of how that tag was created. Older adults may
achieve both of these criteria more readily than younger adults.
General Discussion
Across two experiments we demonstrated an intriguing disso-
ciation between evaluations of the lucky and evaluations of the
unlucky. Participants reported that they preferred the unlucky
when asked to evaluate lucky and unlucky targets immediately
after encountering them, but showed no preference under
cognitive load, and actually preferred the lucky when evaluations
were obtained after loss of explicit memory. That is, when
participants were asked to evaluate lucky and unlucky targets in a
simple questionnaire they expressed a greater liking of unlucky
victims over lucky beneficiaries. However, when their ability to
engage in controlled processes was limited, this espoused
preference did not appear. Finally, when participants learned
about lucky and unlucky individuals, but refrained from explicit
evaluation long enough to allow explicit memory loss, they later
preferred the lucky to the unlucky. Similar to the performance of
amnesic patients in previous affective judgment tasks for good
versus bad actions [16–18], healthy adults’ lingering preference for
lucky over unlucky targets reveals their ability to retain knowledge
of the affective valence of the associated information, despite losing
much of the explicit memory for the event itself.
One potential explanation for participants’ preference for the
lucky is Just World Theory [2] which explains that in order to deal
with the threatening, chaotic, and unpredictable world, people
manage their anxiety with beliefs such as ‘‘good things happen to
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good people’’ and ‘‘bad things happen to bad people.’’ Because
people see themselves as good, they don’t need to live in fear of
bad events occurring, and the world feels less threatening. The
insidious effect of this belief is that when an otherwise innocent
person is observed to experience an unfair or otherwise negative
event, the viewer changes his/her evaluation of the person from
innocent to bad, thereby protecting the viewer’s sense that the
world is just. If these beliefs are activated in initial impression
formation, leading to evaluations that are retained over time, then
Just World Theory could help explain why adults favored the
lucky over the unlucky in the memory experiments.
Another explanation for adults’ preference for the lucky, very
likely in concert with just world beliefs, is an associative one. A
century of work has demonstrated the power of associative
learning, or the acquisition of binding between two mental
concepts [33–34]. The constraints and complexities of associative
learning have been studied in humans and non-human animals
(for reviews see [35–37]) and such learning is believed to be a
central mechanism of learning and memory. More recently, a
specific type of associative learning called evaluative conditioning has
demonstrated that neutral stimuli can come to be valenced simply
by their association with a valenced object, face, taste or scent,
after as little as one instance of association (for a review see [38]).
The luck preference could be explained by this type of ‘‘affective
tagging.’’ That is, the positivity or negativity of the lucky or
unlucky event could rub off on the target, resulting in a more
positive evaluation of lucky individuals and a more negative
evaluation of unlucky individuals.
There are many other cases of ‘‘affective tagging’’ or cases in
which affective information associated with a person, event or
object ‘‘rubs off’’ on evaluations of another person, event or object,
in the literature (e.g., [39–40]). For example, adults tend to dislike
an individual if she bears information they disagree with, and this
dislike emerges even when the bearer herself disagrees with the
information she is sharing [41]. This generalization suggests that
the evaluation of the information has rubbed off on the bearer of
the information. Similarly, people dislike a sweater previously
owned by someone with AIDS or previously worn by someone in a
car accident (that was not his fault), compared to one owned by a
healthy man with no accident history, even when they are told that
the sweater has been thoroughly cleaned [42], suggesting that
affect may have traveled from the owner to the object. Affect may
not only spread from an event, a physical object, or information to
a person, but from one person to another. For example, adults see
an individual as more angry if he/she has described another
person as angry [43]. Similarly, children and adults have shown a
tendency to dislike an average-weight individual more if he is
merely next to an obese person in a waiting room compared to
when he is next to an average weight person ([44]; for related work
on associative stigma see [45]). These demonstrations suggest that a
spatially or psychologically contemporaneous location can lead to
affective spreading across individuals, providing evidence of
affective tagging in other domains.
Evidence consistent with affective tagging was observed in
Experiments 2a and 2b, in which participants continued to prefer
lucky to unlucky individuals even though they had largely
forgotten whether the specific individuals had performed inten-
tional good or intentional bad actions or had experienced lucky or
unlucky events. A simple and parsimonious mechanism like
affective tagging can also explain why the luck preference appears
by 3 years of age and in diverse cultures [3]. Even at a young age,
children know that some events are good and others are bad, and
once these evaluations can be made, the target of the event may be
similarly branded as good or bad.
These studies also contribute to an emerging set of results that
suggest that adults may continue to hold many of the same biases
or attitudes that young children do, but unlike children, they
appear to have the motivation and capacity to correct these. For
example, Epley, Morewedge & Keysar [46] found that adults show
the same egocentric biases in perspective-taking as children, but
that they correct these biases in ways that children do not. More
generally, these results support the view that remnants of early
social and non-social cognition likely lie just under the surface of
adult social and non-social cognition [46–48].
Our results suggest that at the moment of meeting lucky and
unlucky individuals, we may be able to consider that they did not
play a role in causing these events, and therefore discount the
information associated with them (including valence), but when we
fail to engage in this discounting due to distraction or delay, we
rely on the valence of the event more. While we may clearly
distinguish between a lottery winner and a saint in the moment,
months later, we may not.
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